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Substituting or Complementing? 
The Influence of Chinese Overseas Direct Investment on Domestic Exports 
 
 
Abstract 
The aim of this paper is to verify whether overseas direct investment activities of China can substitute or 
complement domestic exports. Using panel data of 85 host countries from 2003 to 2011 we conduct detailed 
empirical examinations within the framework of the gravity model. After correcting for bias caused by synchronism 
between trade flow and investment flow and also for econometrical misspecifications we discover that, contrary to 
all existing studies, Chinese overseas direct investment has a very weak substituting relationship with domestic 
exports. Sub-sample regressions show that Chinese overseas direct investment substitutes exports to developed 
countries but complements exports to developing countries. Panel threshold model further confirms the role of host 
country’s economic developmental stage (measured by per capita GDP) in determining the influence of overseas 
direct investment on exports and detects two thresholds. Thus the sample is divided into three regimes: (1) in the 
first regime where per capita GDP is lower than 1150.39 dollars, overseas direct investment complements exports 
to the host country; (2) in the second regime where per capita GDP falls between 1150.39 and 11601.63 dollars, the 
“gray zone”, overseas direct investment has very weak influence on domestic exports; (3) in the third regime where 
per capita GDP exceeds 11601.63 dollars, overseas direct investment substitutes exports to the host country. This 
paper concludes with possible explanations to the empirical results and the threshold phenomenon. 
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1. Introduction 
Recent decades have witnessed the increasing internationalization of production and its effect on the world 
economy is at the center of economic debate. While advanced economies have been offshoring their productions by 
investing abroad for decades, many studies have detected relative reductions of their exports and argue that 
overseas direct investment can substitute domestic exports. 
Since the beginning of the 21
st
 century, the Chinese government has been advocating the strategy of “Going 
Global” and its overseas direct investment has been rising very fast. According to the joint annual report published 
by the Ministry of Commerce and the National Bureau of Statistics, Chinese overseas direct investment
1
 stock has 
averaged a 44.6% annual growth rate for the past ten years. In 2011, China ranks 13
th
 worldwide in terms of ODI 
stock and 6
th
 in terms of ODI flow. So it would be interesting to study the case of China, which has now become 
the largest exporting economy in the world. 
The aim of this paper is to verify whether overseas direct investment activities can substitute domestic exports. 
This contributes to the literature as previous studies on Chinese ODI have focused primarily on the determinants 
and locational choices of these outward flows, and there hasn’t been any studies systematically analyzing the 
impact of ODI on trade. 
The remainder of this paper will be organized as following: Section 2 reviews theoretical literatures and 
empirical evidence from other economies, and we will also demonstrate that many existing studies concerning 
China are flawed in one way or another (major problems include the endogeneity issue and econometrical 
misspecifications); Section 3 sets our empirical model and introduces the estimation strategies; Section 4 reports 
the empirical results and illustrate the implications; Section 5 adopts the panel threshold model to test the 
heterogeneous influence of ODI on domestic exports and provides robustness checks; Section 6 concludes with  
possible explanations to the empirical results and the threshold phenomenon. 
 
2. Review of Literatures 
In theory, ODI may substitute or complement export trade. Mundell (1957) demonstrated in a general 
Heckscher-Ohlin model that international investment and trade can be perfect substitutes for each other. Hirsch 
(1976) noted that multinational corporations can either serve foreign markets by overseas investment or by export 
trade. Cost determines which way is adopted. But further developments reveals more possible linkages between 
international investment and trade: Markusen (1984) and Markusen and Venables (1998) showed that 
market-seeking direct investment by firms avoiding trade costs or jumping trade barriers can have a substituting 
relationship with trade. Helpman (1984) and Helpman and Krugman (1985) showed the possibility of a 
complementing relationship when vertical direct investments are involved due to the fragmentation of a production 
process geographically. This happens when the host economy offers comparative cost advantage and the source 
economy chooses to delocalize several or all stages of its production. 
As for empirical literatures, just as Schmitz and Helmberger (1970) stated, the relationship between 
investments and trade is more of an empirical issue rather than a theoretical one and results can vary across 
countries and industries. Typical studies supporting substituting relationship between overseas direct investment 
and export trade are Horst (1972), Svensson (1996), Bayoumi and Lipworth (1997) and Ma et al. (2000). And 
studies supporting complementing relationship include Lipsey and Weiss (1984), Blomström et al. (1988), 
Grossman and Helpman (1989), Clausing (2000), Head and Ries (2001). Particularly, Amiti et al. (2000) discovered 
                                                        
1 Thereafter referred to as ODI. 
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that the relationship between overseas direct investment and trade is more likely to be substitutioning in the case of 
horizontal investments between countries that are similar in terms of factor endowments or when trade costs are 
high. Otherwise, vertical investments by multinational corporations are more likely to lead to complementing 
relationships. 
Empirical studies concerning the case of China are mainly in Chinese. They seem to have reached the same 
conclusion that Chinese ODI complements export trade. Early researches such as Wang (2003), Cai & Liu (2004), 
Zhang (2005) and Zhang (2007) use basic descriptive statistics and simple regressions and conclude that Chinese 
ODI can promote export trade. These results may not be reliable because they are constrained by the availability of 
data since the National Bureau of Statistics of China didn’t start to publish host-country specific ODI data until 
2003. Xiang (2009) and Chen (2010) use cross-country panel data but adopt unary linear regression model. In fact, 
using ODI as a sole explanatory variable of exports can cause serious omitted variable bias. During the past ten 
years, Chinese ODI and exports are both on upward trends (thus positively correlated), so it’s natural that unary 
regressions can yield the conclusion that Chinese ODI promotes export trade. But this can be far from the truth. 
Chai & Hu (2011), Zhou & Niu (2012) and Zhang & Huang (2013) use cross-country panel data and the gravity 
model but estimate with pooled OLS methods. This method neglects the heterogeneity of individual effects across 
countries and also produces heavily biased results. 
Most importantly, we note that all existing literatures use current ODI stock or flow data as the explanatory 
variables of exports and can result in serious endogenous problem: current ODI flows and export trade are subject 
to simultaneous exogenous shocks and demonstrate synchronism. These exogenous shocks include fluctuations of 
exchange rates, change of national policies, macroeconomic trend of the world and also the diplomatic relationship 
between China and the trade partner (which is also the host country of Chinese ODI). Based on the knowledge that 
current ODI stock data is calculated by adding current ODI flow data into existing stock data (after adjusting for 
some gains, losses and depreciation), we can also know that current ODI stock data demonstrates synchronism with 
trade data to some extent. 
The synchronism of ODI and export trade can further produce misleading results as our aim is to study 
whether overseas production capacities can substitute or complement exports rather than the statistical correlation 
between ODI and exports. Based on the arguments above we consider it inappropriate to use current ODI flow or 
stock data as explanatory variables of exports. So this paper aims to produce accurate empirical results using 
carefully selected explanatory variables and by correcting for the econometrical misspecifications. 
 
3. Empirical Model, Data and Estimation Strategies 
3.1 The Gravity Model 
As Bayoumi and Eichengree (1997) noted “the gravity equation has long been the work horse for empirical 
studies on the pattern of trade”, the gravity model originally proposed by Tinbergen (1962) and Poyhonen (1963) 
has been very empirically successful for its superior explanatory power in trade-related studies. This model, in its 
simplest form, states that the bilateral trade volume between a pair of countries is positively correlated with their 
economic scales and negatively correlated with bilateral geographic distance. 
Incorporate ODI into the gravity model and add a few control variables, we have our empirical model written 
as below: 
𝑙𝑛⁡(𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖,𝑡) = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 × 𝑙𝑛⁡(𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐶ℎ𝑛,𝑡) + 𝛽2 × 𝑙𝑛⁡(𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽3 × 𝑙𝑛⁡(𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖) + 𝛽4 × 𝑙𝑛⁡(𝑂𝐷𝐼⁡𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑖,𝑡−1)
+ 𝛽5 ×𝑁𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑖 + 𝛽6 × 𝐹𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7 × 𝐺7𝑖 + 𝛽8 × 𝐸𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑖𝑠ℎ𝑖 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
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Where ln(*) denotes the natural logarithm, this procedure would greatly reduce the variance of variables and 
eliminate the disturbance of heteroskedasticity. In this case, the coefficients β1, β2,β3,β4 would reflect the elasticity 
between each explanatory variable and the explained variable; 
Exporti,t denotes the total export country i receives from China in year t, which would be the explained 
variable; 
GDPChn,t denotes the gross domestic product of China in year t, which would reflect the export supply 
capacity of China and have a positive expected sign; 
GDPi,t denotes the gross domestic product of country i in year t, which would reflect the potential market 
scale in country i and also have a positive expected sign; 
Distancei denotes the geographic distance between country i and China, this is measured by the great circle 
distance between capitals and reflects transportation cost, which would have a negative expected sign; 
Neighbori denotes countries that are adjacent to China, which has a positive expected sign because of a 
common border; 
FTAi,t denotes countries that are in free trade agreements with China, which has a positive expected sign as 
free trade agreements set up favorable policies for participants; 
G7i denotes Group of Seven countries, high-income countries and also the main destination of Chinese 
exports, which has a positive expected sign; 
Englishi denotes countries that set English as their official language, which has a positive expected sign 
because English is widely used worldwide in business communications; 
μi denotes the individual country effect, which consists of the unobserved and the unobservable effects of 
each particular country. 
As for the key explanatory variable ODI_stocki,t-1, there are two main reasons that we use the lag term of ODI 
stock: 
(1) The synchronism of current ODI flow and stock with international trade will result in endogeneity in 
regressions, which may lead to biased results (and predictably upward-biased); 
(2) There are certain time lags from the very beginning of investment to the final formation of actual 
production capacities (for instance, obtaining approval from the local government, construction of production 
facilities, negotiation procedures involved in acquisitions and merges, recruiting and training of local labor force). 
For the above reasons we consider it most appropriate to use the lag term of ODI data as the key explanatory 
variable but we will also provide results using the current data of ODI stock and flow so that we can compare 
results. Due to the endogeneity issue caused by synchronism between trade and investment flow, we expect results 
of the latter two to be upward-biased. 
3.2 Data and Variables 
The <Outward Direct Investment Statistical Bulletin> jointly published by the Ministry of Commerce and the 
National Bureau of Statistics of China provides Chinese ODI stock and flow data in most countries and territories. 
For consideration of economic significance, we use countries that have Chinese ODI stock exceeding one hundred 
million dollars only and there are 91 economies meeting this criterion. After dropping HongKong, Macao, North 
Korea, Cayman Islands, Bermuda, the British Virgin Islands
2
, we have 85 economies in our sample as Table 1 
shows: 
                                                        
2 HongKong and Macao dropped because of political connection with China; North Korea dropped because of unavailability of 
reliable GDP data; Cayman Islands, Bermuda, the British Virgin Islands dropped because of their statuses as popular tax-avoiding 
countries and have very large inflows of non-production investments. 
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Table 1  Host Countries and Territories of Chinese ODI in Sample 
Asia 
(28) 
Afghanistan; Cambodia; India; Indonesia; Iran; Iraq; Japan; Kazakhstan; Kyrgyzstan; South 
Korea; Laos; Malaysia; Mongolia; Myanmar; Pakistan; Philippines; Qatar; Saudi Arabia; 
Singapore; Sri Lanka; Tajikistan; Thailand; Turkmenistan; Turkey; The United Arab Emirates; 
Uzbekistan; Vietnam; Yemen 
Africa 
(24) 
Algeria; Angola; Botswana; Chad; Congo Dem; Congo Rep; Egypt; Ethiopia; Gabon; Ghana; 
Guinea; Kenya; Liberia; Madagascar; Mali; Mauritius; Niger; Nigeria; South Africa; Sudan; 
Tanzania; Uganda; Zambia; Zimbabwe 
Europe 
(16) 
Belgium; France; Georgia; Germany; Hungary; Ireland; Italy; Luxembourg; Netherlands; Norway; 
Poland; Romania; Russia; Spain; Sweden; United Kingdom 
America 
(12) 
Argentina; Brazil; Chile; Cuba; Ecuador; Guyana; Mexico; Panama; Peru; Venezuela; Canada; 
United States of America 
Oceania 
(5) 
Australia; Marshall Islands; New Zealand; Papua New Guinea; Samoa 
Note: Range of observation is 2003 through 2011. 
 
    Up till 2011, Chinese ODI stock in the host countries listed above takes up more than 90% of Chinese ODI 
stock worldwide, making it a very comprehensive and representative sample. Data source and expected signs of 
variables to be used in further empirical analysis are summarized as below in Table 2: 
Table 2  Data Source and Expected Signs of Variables 
Variable Data Source Expected Signs 
Exporti,t < China Statistical Yearbook > Non 
GDPChn,t World Bank WDI Database + 
GDPi,t World Bank WDI Database + 
Distancei City Distance Calculator - 
Neighbori Map of the World + 
FTAi,t Ministry of Commerce of China + 
G7i Common Sense + 
Englishi Common Sense + 
ODIi stock and flow <Outward Direct Investment Statistical Bulletin> To be studied 
Per Capita GDPi World Bank WDI Database To be used elsewhere 
 
3.3 The Hausman-Taylor Estimator 
Earlier researches using the gravity model were carried out with cross-sectional data, but this doesn’t allow 
for heterogeneity in regression equations and yield biased estimates. Panel data regression serves to correct this bias. 
Usually, panel data model can be estimated using Pooled OLS
3
, fixed effect model
4
 and random effect model
5
. 
The POLS method also assumes no heterogeneity for all countries just like cross-sectional regressions and is 
rarely suitable for cross-country panels. This method yields heavily biased results (see Chai & Hu (2011), Zhou & 
Niu (2012) and Zhang & Huang (2013)). In the empirical part of this paper, F tests and LM tests ruled out the 
                                                        
3 Thereafter referred to as POLS. 
4 Thereafter referred to as FE. 
5 Thereafter referred to as RE. 
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possibility of POLS as an acceptable method for the estimation of our model. 
As for the FE method, it provides the within-group estimator by assigning different intercepts for different 
countries to capture the heterogeneity so it provides consistent estimates regardless whether or not the country 
individual effect is correlated with the explanatory variables. Unfortunately, time-invariant variables (including 
geographic distance and several other dummy variables in the gravity equation) are crossed out when we apply the 
within operator in FE, so their coefficients vanish in the regression. From this perspective, the FE method is not 
suitable for the estimation of the gravity model either. 
The RE method, which doesn’t cross out the country individual effects, can produce estimates for all variables 
and may also be more efficient. But its consistency relies on the strict assumption that all explanatory variables are 
uncorrelated with the country individual effect. Hence, it’s important to verify the consistency of RE method using 
Hausman test, whose null hypothesis is that there is no systematic difference between FE method and RE method. 
If the calculated test statistic rejects the null hypothesis, this suggests that the RE method is inconsistent and proves 
some correlation between some or all explanatory variables and the country individual effect. In the empirical part 
of this paper, Hausman tests reject the null hypothesis of each regression, so the RE method isn’t appropriate for the 
estimation of our gravity model. This reveals that some or all of our explanatory variables are correlated with the 
country individual effect. 
Fortunately, Hausman and Taylor (1981) proposed a procedure as an alternative to both the FE and RE 
method. It basically involves finding instrumental variables for the endogenous variables and then make regressions 
using the RE method. For our empirical equation, consider a panel model written as following: 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝑥1,𝑖𝑡
′ 𝛽1 + 𝑥2,𝑖𝑡
′ 𝛽2 + 𝑧1,𝑖
′ 𝛿1 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
Where x’ are time-variant explanatory variables and z’ are time-invariant explanatory variables. And 
explanatory variables with the subscript of 1 refers to exogenous variables (uncorrelated with the country individual 
effect μi), those with the subscript of 2 refers to endogenous variables (correlated with the country individual effect 
μi). Note that there are no endogenous time-invariant variables in this model because all time-invariant variables in 
our gravity equation are strictly exogenous. And z’1,i is the geographic distance in our model. 
Hausman and Taylor (1981) suggested using (𝑥2,𝑖𝑡 − 𝑥2,𝑖̅̅ ̅̅ ) as the instrumental variable of x2,it. Obviously, on 
one hand, (𝑥2,𝑖𝑡 − 𝑥2,𝑖̅̅ ̅̅ ) is strongly correlated with x2,it. On the other hand, according to the law of iterated 
expectations, we have: 
𝐸[(𝑥2,𝑖𝑡 − 𝑥2,𝑖̅̅ ̅̅ )𝜇𝑖] = 𝐸𝜇𝑖𝐸[(𝑥2,𝑖𝑡 − 𝑥2,𝑖̅̅ ̅̅ )𝜇𝑖|𝜇𝑖] = 𝐸𝜇𝑖{𝜇𝑖𝐸[(𝑥2,𝑖𝑡 − 𝑥2,𝑖̅̅ ̅̅ )|𝜇𝑖]} = 𝐸𝜇𝑖*𝜇𝑖 ∙ 0+ = 0 
    So (𝑥2,𝑖𝑡 − 𝑥2,𝑖̅̅ ̅̅ ) is a valid instrumental variable for x2,it. Usually, the identification of the endogenous 
variables involves making experimental regressions and comparing each estimation result with the FE estimator 
using another round of Hausman tests as Baltagi et al. (2003) recommended. If the identification of the endogenous 
variables is correct and the instrumental variables are valid, there should not be systematic difference between the 
FE estimator and the HT estimator, which is signaled by the acceptance of the null hypothesis. 
 
4. Results and Implications 
4.1 Whole Sample Regressions 
Whole sample regression results are exhibited in Table 3. The first column shows the regression result using 
the lag term of ODI stock as the key explanatory variable, which we are interested in. The second and third column 
shows results using the current terms of ODI stock and flow respectively for comparison. The gravity model 
demonstrates excellent explanatory power in general, with the Wald Chi
2
 statistic overwhelmingly exceeding the 
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borderline of 10, indicating a high level of overall significance of the regression equation. Note that for each 
column two Hausman test results are provided, with the first one testing RE against FE and the second testing HT 
against FE. Results show that the RE method is rejected at 1% level of significance and the HT method is proved to 
be consistent. 
Table 3  Whole Sample Regressions Using Hausman-Taylor Estimator 
Explained variable is 
ln(Exporti) 
(1) (2) (3) 
ln(GDPChn) 
1.165*** 
(18.95) 
1.242*** 
(20.15) 
1.286*** 
(24.77) 
ln(GDPi) 
0.117* 
(1.94) 
0.103* 
(1.76) 
0.075# 
(1.30) 
ln(Distancei) 
-0.852** 
(-2.23) 
-0.904** 
(-2.35) 
-0.922** 
(-2.40) 
ln(ODI_stocki)(-1) 
-0.003 
(-0.17) 
  
ln(ODI_stocki)  
0.015 
(0.93) 
 
ln(ODI_flowi)   
0.011* 
(1.68) 
Neighbori 
-0.372 
(-0.58) 
-0.439 
(-0.67) 
-0.454 
(-0.70) 
FTAi 
-0.078 
(-0.62) 
-0.138 
(-1.05) 
-0.159 
(-1.16) 
G7i 
3.155*** 
(4.69) 
3.161*** 
(4.67) 
3.165*** 
(4.66) 
Englishi 
-0.316 
(-0.78) 
-0.310 
(-0.76) 
-0.316 
(-0.78) 
Constant 
-16.94*** 
(-4.54) 
-18.55*** 
(-4.98) 
-18.88*** 
(-5.22) 
Model Information 
N=661 
Chi2=1716.5 
N=745 
Chi2=2296.6 
N=759 
Chi2=2268.3 
Hausman Test 1 p=0.0001*** p=0.0001*** p=0.0001*** 
Hausman Test 2 p=0.2148 p=0.1912 p=0.1866 
Note: (1) t statistics in parentheses; (2) # p<0.20, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01; (3) Hausman test 
1---fixed effect versus random effect; (4) Hausman test 2---fixed effect versus Hausman-Taylor. 
 
The GDP of China is significant at 1% level with an estimated elasticity coefficient around 1.20, and the GDP 
of the trade partner is also significant around 0.10. This means a 0.83% increase of China GDP or a 10% increase 
of trade partner GDP will boost Chinese exports by about 1%. The estimated elasticity coefficient of geographic 
distance is around 0.90 and significant at 5% level, revealing that with all things constant, a 1% increase in 
geographic distance will reduce exports by about 0.9%. The estimated coefficients and their significance levels 
match with the theoretical expectations of the gravity model, again proving its excellent explanatory power. 
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Take a look at the control variable Neighbori, we discover that countries sharing a common border with China 
doesn’t receive more exports from China, which is contrary to our expectation. But considering that the border of 
China is mainly constituted of mountains and deep forests (especially North-West border), which are in fact natural 
barriers of trade, this phenomenon is understandable. FTAi and Englishi aren’t statistically significant either, 
indicating China yet has to establish more cooperation with treaty countries and to exploit the common language 
advantage (consider the fact that English is widely taught and used in China). G7i is positively significant, 
indicating that Chinese exports are more directed to high-income partners. 
Let’s focus on the key explanatory variable. We can find that the estimated coefficient of ln(ODI_stocki)(-1) is 
-0.003 with a t-statistic of -0.17, it doesn’t acquire any statistical significance but reveals that Chinese ODI very 
weakly substitutes exports on the whole. A 1% increase of Chinese ODI in one host country will substitute about 
0.003% exports to that particular country. 
For ln(ODI_stocki) and ln(ODI_flowi), the estimated coefficients are 0.015 and 0.011, and the latter is 
statistically significant. The comparison of these three coefficients proves that, due to the synchronism between 
ODI flow and trade, regressions using the current term of ODI stock and flow data yield upward-biased results, 
right to our prediction. Using the lag term of ODI stock to analyze the relationship between overseas production 
capacities and export trade effectively correct this bias and discover that there actually exists a very weak 
substituting relationship between ODI and export trade. 
4.2 Sub-sample Regressions 
Overseas investments may be driven by different motivations. Many literatures classify overseas investments 
in developed countries as market-seeking or strategic asset seeking investments and those in developing countries 
as resource-seeking. Investments of different types may have different influence on exports. In light of that we split 
the sample into developed and developing countries groups. 
Sub-sample regression results are exhibited in Table 4. 
Results from the sub-sample of developed countries can be seen in column (4) ~ (6), column (7) ~ (9) report 
results of developing countries. The framework of gravity model still holds for each sub-sample, with the 
expansion of GDP boosting exports and geographic distance working the opposite way. 
For developed countries, Chinese ODI can substitute exports to the host country, the estimated coefficient is 
-0.083 and significant at 1% level, this means that a 1% increase of Chinese overseas investment stock in the host 
country will reduce exports to that particular country by about 0.083%. For developing countries things are 
different: a 1% increase of Chinese overseas investment stock in the host country will complement exports to that 
country by about 0.025%. 
The upward-bias persists in sub-sample regressions: 
(1) For developed countries, if the explanatory variable is ln(ODI_stocki), the negative effect will be reduced 
to -0.040, and if the explanatory variable is ln(ODI_flowi), the negative effect will turn into weakly positive effect; 
(2) For developing countries, if the explanatory variable is ln(ODI_stocki), the positive effect will be raised to 
0.040, and if the explanatory variable is ln(ODI_flowi), the significance of the positive effect will be overstated 
(from a 20% significance level to a 1% level). 
Since sample splitting provides distinctive results for developed and developing countries, it’s natural to 
question whether there is some connection between the influence of Chinese ODI upon exports and the economic 
developmental stage of the host country. This will be further investigated in the next section using the panel 
threshold model. The reasons why different types of countries demonstrate different effects will also be discussed 
in the final section of this paper. 
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Table 4  Sub-Sample Regressions Using Hausman-Taylor Estimator (developed and developing countries) 
Explained variable is 
ln(Exporti) 
Developed Countries Developing Countries 
(4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
ln(GDPChn) 
0.891*** 
(9.78) 
0.821*** 
(9.00) 
0.665*** 
(8.51) 
1.267*** 
(18.60) 
1.360*** 
(19.85) 
1.448*** 
(24.96) 
ln(GDPi) 
0.134# 
(1.47) 
0.219** 
(2.43) 
0.282*** 
(3.05) 
0.067 
(0.99) 
0.049 
(0.73) 
0.032 
(0.47) 
ln(Distancei) 
-1.072** 
(-2.00) 
-0.993* 
(-1.71) 
-0.909# 
(-1.47) 
-0.430 
(-0.92) 
-0.495 
(-1.05) 
-0.534 
(-1.11) 
ln(ODI_stocki)(-1) 
-0.083*** 
(-4.11) 
  
0.025# 
(1.44) 
  
ln(ODI_stocki)  
-0.040* 
(-1.95) 
  
0.040** 
(2.20) 
 
ln(ODI_flowi)   
0.002 
(0.25) 
  
0.021*** 
(2.85) 
Neighbori    
0.311 
(0.44) 
0.248 
(0.34) 
0.244 
(0.33) 
FTAi 
-0.128 
(-0.80) 
-0.112 
(-0.67) 
-0.068 
(-0.38) 
-0.094 
(-0.66) 
-0.166 
(-1.10) 
-0.194 
(-1.24) 
G7i 
1.775*** 
(2.95) 
1.750*** 
(2.68) 
1.722** 
(2.47) 
   
Englishi 
0.569 
(0.89) 
0.454 
(0.65) 
0.345 
(0.46) 
-0.642# 
(-1.41) 
-0.637# 
(-1.38) 
-0.620# 
(-1.33) 
Constant 
-5.681 
(-1.14) 
-6.837# 
(-1.28) 
-5.026 
(-0.90) 
-22.93*** 
(-5.02) 
-24.78*** 
(-5.41) 
-26.32*** 
(-5.84) 
Model Information 
N=153 
Chi2=371.6 
N=173 
Chi2=551.2 
N=180 
Chi2=544.2 
N=508 
Chi2=1670.1 
N=572 
Chi2=2187.0 
N=579 
Chi2=2186.0 
Hausman Test 1 p=0.0012*** p=0.0004*** p=0.0001*** p=0.0003*** p=0.0002*** p=0.0001*** 
Hausman Test 2 p=0.4253 p=0.2132 p=0.1532 p=0.1973 p=0.1605 p=0.3817 
Note: (1) t statistics in parentheses; (2) # p<0.20, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01; (3) Hausman test 1---fixed effect 
versus random effect; (4) Hausman test 2---fixed effect versus Hausman-Taylor. 
 
5. Extension of Empirical Examination 
In this section, we will investigate the potential heterogeneity of the influence of Chinese ODI upon exports 
using the panel threshold model originally proposed by Hansen (1999, 2000). We will also provide robustness 
checks to address the potential endogeneity problem inherently involved in the gravity model to ensure that our 
empirical results obtained within the framework of gravity model is reliable. 
5.1 The Panel Threshold Model 
Distinctive empirical results obtained from sub-sample regressions provoke the suspicion that how Chinese 
ODI influence domestic exports may have something to do with the economic developmental stage of the host 
country. On the spectrum of economic development, there may be certain thresholds between which Chinese ODI 
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may have different influence on domestic exports. Classifying host countries into developed and developing groups 
may be one way of exploring this potential heterogeneity but may not be accurate. We borrow from the ideas of 
Hansen (1999, 2000), measure the economic developmental stage of the host country by its per capita GDP (year 
2000 fixed price in US dollars) and our panel threshold model can be written as: 
𝑙𝑛⁡(𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖,𝑡) = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 × 𝑙𝑛⁡(𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐶ℎ𝑛,𝑡) + 𝛽2 × 𝑙𝑛⁡(𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽3(𝑃𝑒𝑟⁡𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎⁡𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡) × 𝑙𝑛⁡(𝑂𝐷𝐼⁡𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝛽4
× 𝐹𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
Where 𝛽3(𝑃𝑒𝑟⁡𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎⁡𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡) means the coefficient of 𝑙𝑛⁡(𝑂𝐷𝐼⁡𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑖,𝑡−1) is a function of host country 
per capita GDP. Note that since the panel threshold model is based on non-dynamic fixed effect model, all 
time-invariant variables vanish in our equation but consistent estimates can still be yielded. Starting from the 
simplest form of single-threshold model, we have: 
𝑙𝑛⁡(𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖,𝑡) = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 × 𝑙𝑛⁡(𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐶ℎ𝑛,𝑡) + 𝛽2 × 𝑙𝑛⁡(𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛿1 × 𝑂𝐹𝐷𝐼_𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑖,𝑡−1 × 𝐼(𝑃𝑒𝑟⁡𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎⁡𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡 ≤ 𝛾)
+ 𝛿2 ×𝑂𝐹𝐷𝐼_𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑖,𝑡−1 × 𝐼(𝑃𝑒𝑟⁡𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎⁡𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡 > 𝛾) + 𝛽4 × 𝐹𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
    Where γ is the threshold parameter and I(*) is the indicator function which takes the value of 1 if the condition 
in the parentheses is satisfied and the value of 0 otherwise. For each regression depending on different selection of 
γ we note each residual sum of squares as S1(γ) and the estimated threshold parameter is identified as: 
?̂? = 𝐴𝑟𝑔𝑀𝑖𝑛,𝑆1(𝛾)- 
After the identification of ?̂?, we also have to test the significance of the threshold by testing: 
H0: δ1=δ2; Ha: δ1≠δ2 
If the null hypothesis is accepted, the threshold model falls back to be a linear one. Otherwise, the existence of 
a threshold is proved. The F statistic used to test this hypothesis can be written as: 
𝐹 =
𝑆0 − 𝑆1(?̂?)
𝜎?̂?
2 =
𝑆0 − 𝑆1(?̂?)
𝑆1(?̂?) 𝑛(𝑇 − 1)⁄
 
Since the distribution of this F statistic is non-standard, Hansen (1999, 2000) suggested using the bootstrap 
simulations to obtain the asymptotic distribution of it. If the F statistic exceeds the critical value calculated from the 
bootstrap simulations, the null hypothesis gets rejected. In this case, we move on to search the possibility of a 
second threshold and continue the procedures listed above. 
Panel threshold model estimation results are exhibited in Table 5 and 6. 
The threshold model is estimated using the FE method, F statistic confirms the overall significance of the 
regression equation and a R
2
 of 0.7694 demonstrates the excellent explanatory power of the threshold model. Two 
thresholds are detected in the model: the first is 1150.39 of per capita GDP and the second is 11601.63 of per capita 
GDP. They divide the whole sample into three regimes and the estimated coefficients differ greatly in each of them: 
(1) For those observations with host country per capita GDP lower than 1150.39 US dollars (year 2000 fixed 
price), Chinese ODI complements exports to the host country. A 1% increase of investment stock in the host 
country will raise exports by about 0.035%, significant at 5% level; 
(2) For those observations whose per capita GDP falling within the range of (1150.39, 11601.63), Chinese 
ODI in the host country has a very weak substituting relationship with exports. Hence we call this the “gray zone”; 
(3) For those observations with host country per capita GDP higher than 11601.63 US dollars, Chinese ODI 
substitutes exports to the host country. A 1% increase of investment stock in the host country will reduce exports by 
about 0.081%, significant at 1% level. 
10 
Table 5  Statistical Significance Test of Thresholds 
Hypothesis Tests F Statistic 
Critical Value Rejection 
of H0 1% 5% 
H0: No Threshold; Ha: One Threshold 55.09 20.45 10.93 Yes 
H0: One Threshold ; Ha: Two Thresholds 17.11 23.31 11.64 Yes 
H0: Two Thresholds ; Ha: Three Thresholds 8.61 24.72 11.99 No 
Note: Critical value obtained from Bootstrap simulations. (Number of times of simulations = 500) 
 
Table 6  Panel Threshold Model Regression 
Explained variable is ln(Exporti) 
ln(GDPChn) 
1.226*** 
(17.50) 
ln(GDPi) 
0.115# 
(1.32) 
ln(ODI_stocki)(-1) 
when Per Capita GDP < 1150.39 
0 .035** 
(2.18) 
ln(ODI_stocki)(-1) 
when 1150.39 < Per Capita GDP < 11601.63 
-0.011 
(-0.69) 
ln(ODI_stocki)(-1) 
when Per Capita GDP > 11601.63 
-0.081*** 
(-4.48) 
FTAi 
-0.182# 
(-1.49) 
Constant 
-25.467*** 
(-16.56) 
Model Information 
N=653 
F=313.15 
R2=0.7694 
Note: (1) t statistics in parentheses; (2) # p<0.20, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
 
    In a word, overseas direct investment stock complements exports to low-income host countries but substitutes 
exports to high-income host countries. This conclusion matches what we discover from the sub-sample regressions, 
where we classify the countries into developed and developing groups. But the bisection method fails to discover 
the “gray zone”, where Chinese overseas investment stock has very weak influence on exports. As a matter of fact, 
of all 653 observations in our sample, 216 of them fall within the per capita GDP range between 1150.69 and 
11601.63 US dollars. For these observations, Chinese overseas direct investment stock has very weak influence on 
export trade. The possible reasons leading to this threshold phenomenon will be discussed in Section 6. 
5.2 Robustness Checks 
    One major defect of the gravity model is its inherent endogenous problem. As many economists have pointed 
out, there exists an obvious two-way causality relationship between economic growth and trade, so using GDP data 
as the explanatory variables may yield biased results. To alleviate the disturbance of endogeneity, we use the lag 
terms of GDP data as the explanatory variables and provide robustness checks, the results are exhibited in Table 7. 
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Table 7  Robustness Checks (Regressions Using Lag Terms of GDP as Explanatory Variables in the Gravity Model) 
Explained variable is 
ln(Exporti) 
Whole Sample Developed Countries Developing Countries 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
ln(GDPChn)(-1) 
1.096*** 
(16.78) 
1.060*** 
(16.05) 
1.154*** 
(20.88) 
0.784*** 
(7.69) 
0.638*** 
(6.44) 
0.601*** 
(7.17) 
1.199*** 
(16.54) 
1.146*** 
(15.52) 
1.302*** 
(21.10) 
ln(GDPi)(-1) 
0.088# 
(1.48) 
0.077# 
(1.29) 
0.068 
(1.13) 
0.144# 
(1.53) 
0.155# 
(1.64) 
0.158* 
(1.72) 
0.043 
(0.64) 
0.033 
(0.49) 
0.053 
(0.78) 
ln(Distancei) 
-0.845** 
(-2.24) 
-0.846** 
(-2.26) 
-0.862** 
(-2.28) 
-1.034* 
(-1.88) 
-0.940* 
(-1.72) 
-0.914* 
(-1.70) 
-0.434 
(-0.93) 
-0.442 
(-0.96) 
-0.457 
(-0.97) 
ln(ODI_stocki)(-1) 
0.020 
(1.23) 
  
-0.060*** 
(-2.64) 
  
0.047*** 
(2.59) 
  
ln(ODI_stocki)  
0.042** 
(2.38) 
  
-0.0130 
(-0.58) 
  
0.081*** 
(3.94) 
 
ln(ODI_flowi)   
0.009# 
(1.40) 
  
-0.002 
(-0.18) 
  
0.020*** 
(2.66) 
Neighbori 
-0.383 
(-0.60) 
-0.402 
(-0.63) 
-0.399 
(-0.62) 
   
0.294 
(0.42) 
0.263 
(0.37) 
0.301 
(0.42) 
FTAi 
-0.059 
(-0.45) 
-0.064 
(-0.48) 
-0.078 
(-0.57) 
-0.118 
(-0.66) 
-0.047 
(-0.26) 
-0.026 
(-0.14) 
-0.069 
(-0.46) 
-0.084 
(-0.56) 
-0.089 
(-0.57) 
G7i 
3.131*** 
(4.71) 
3.102*** 
(4.69) 
3.141*** 
(4.70) 
1.751*** 
(2.84) 
1.705*** 
(2.78) 
1.695*** 
(2.80) 
   
Englishi 
-0.331 
(-0.83) 
-0.333 
(-0.84) 
-0.335 
(-0.84) 
0.521 
(0.79) 
0.409 
(0.62) 
0.378 
(0.59) 
-0.651# 
(-1.44) 
-0.632# 
(-1.40) 
-0.612# 
(-1.33) 
Constant 
-14.27*** 
(-3.85) 
-13.15*** 
(-3.57) 
-15.15*** 
(-4.24) 
-3.208 
(-0.62) 
-0.458 
(-0.09) 
0.193 
(0.04) 
-20.30*** 
(-4.46) 
-18.81*** 
(-4.16) 
-23.07*** 
(-5.20) 
Model Information 
N=662 
Chi2=1459.8 
N=668 
Chi2=1487.2 
N=676 
Chi2=1465.0 
N=153 
Chi2=268.5 
N=155 
Chi2=252.9 
N=160 
Chi2=264.1 
N=509 
Chi2=1424.0 
N=513 
Chi2=1485.9 
N=516 
Chi2=1450.4 
Hausman Test 1 p=0.0002 p=0.0001 p=0.0001 p=0.0014 p=0.0017 p=0.0012 p=0.0006 p=0.0001 p=0.0006 
Hausman Test 2 p=0.2618 p=0.2664 p=0.2315 p=0.4006 p=0.3611 p=0.1954 p=0.2231 p=0.2163 p=0.3212 
Note: (1) t statistics in parentheses; (2) # p<0.20, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01; (3) Hausman test 1---fixed effect versus random effect; (4) Hausman test 2---fixed effect versus Hausman-Taylor. 
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In Table 7, we are pleased to find that the gravity model still holds when we use lag terms of bilateral GDP as 
explanatory variables. And the results are mostly consistent with our previous findings. Our findings in previous 
sections are robust under different variable selections. The influence of Chinese overseas direct investment on its 
exports is vague in general, but it substitutes exports to developed countries and complements exports to 
developing countries. Both effects are significant at a 1% level (see columns numbered (1), (4) and (7) in Table 7). 
The upward-bias still persists, which again confirms the bias caused by synchronism between trade and investment 
flow is stickily systematic. 
 
6. Conclusions 
This paper serves to verify the relationship between Chinese overseas direct investment and its domestic 
exports. Using panel data of 85 host countries from 2003 to 2011 we discover a very weak substituting relationship 
between overseas direct investment and domestic export. By dividing the sample into developed and developing 
sub-samples we find distinctive results: direct investment in developed countries significantly substitutes exports to 
the host country, a 1% increase of investment stock will reduce exports by about 0.083%; while direct investment 
in developing countries complements exports, a 1% increase of investment stock will raise exports by about 
0.025%. Panel threshold model further confirms the role of host country developmental stage (measured by per 
capita GDP) in determining the influence of overseas direct investment on domestic exports and detects two 
thresholds. Thus the sample is divided into three regimes: (1) in the first regime where per capita GDP is lower than 
1150.39 dollars, overseas direct investment complements exports to the host country; (2) in the second regime 
where per capita GDP falls between 1150.39 and 11601.63 dollars, the “gray zone”, overseas direct investment has 
very weak influence on domestic exports; (3) in the third regime where per capita GDP exceeds 11601.63 dollars, 
overseas direct investment substitutes exports to the host country. 
As to why different types of countries demonstrate different response to Chinese overseas investments, we 
offer two possible explanations to be illustrated below. 
6.1 Trade Barrier to Lucrative Markets 
Overseas direct investment may be the response to “jump” trade barriers as Markusen (1984) suggested. 
Multinational corporations may avoid trade barriers of the target market by direct investments. By forming 
production capacities in the target market, the multinational corporation serves the target market directly rather than 
exporting their commodities. In this way, the corporation also gets closer to the demand information of the target 
market and saves on transportation costs. 
In recent years, many advanced economies are going through the trend of “re-industrialization”. As these 
economies have long been accusing “cheap” exports from China of depriving them of employment opportunities, 
this trend of “re-industrialization” may actually turns out to be a great chance for Chinese firms to invest abroad. If 
the core interest of their manufacturing industries is not compromised, advanced economies would hold a friendly 
attitude towards investments from China. By investing in these economies and meeting their requirement of certain 
“local component criterion”, Chinese overseas direct investments may enjoy profits by selling abroad and also 
serves to rescue the sluggish job market and weak economic performance of advanced economies. This would turn 
out to be a “win-win” situation rather than a “zero-sum” game which it used to be when Chinese exports squeezed 
local firms out of the market. However, producing in advanced economies may induce higher production cost, 
especially higher labor cost. They may also have to deal with stricter environmental supervisions, so the firms need 
to weigh these additional costs against the benefits. 
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Overall, Chinese direct investments in high-income countries often substitute exports, which is exactly 
indicated by our empirical results. 
6.2 Inadequacy of Supporting Industries 
Overseas direct investment in low-income economies may have a different influence on exports. Investments 
may be driven by resource-seeking motivations, which wouldn’t have any substituting effect on exports in theory. 
More importantly, even if the investment is market-seeking, it would only substitute trade within the same 
industry but promotes exports of its supporting industries. For a less developed economy with poor infrastructure 
and inadequacy of supporting industries, Chinese firms operating there may come across difficulties finding 
suitable production machineries as well as intermediate inputs. This is not a rare situation in reality, as events of 
Chinese firms operating in Africa have proved repeatedly that local supporting industries often fail to meet quality 
requirements and to complete the orders in time. Thus the multinational corporation tend to purchase machineries 
and intermediate inputs from its source economy, in this way promotes export trade of its supporting industries to 
the host economy. The same thing wouldn’t happen in advanced economies as they have well-developed and 
mature industrial systems so Chinese firms operating there can acquire machinery and intermediate inputs of 
excellent quality much more easily. 
In addition, due to inferior quality of property rights protection, Chinese firms operating in less-developed 
economies may prefer intra-corporation trade over contract deals so as to reduce uncertainties, this would also 
contribute to a complementing relationship between investment and trade for low-income host countries. 
And for middle-income economies, the two effects discussed above may cancel out each other as neither can 
achieve a dominating status. In this case, Chinese overseas direct investment would turn out to have a vague 
relationship with domestic exports. 
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